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Storm Engine

by admin | April 30th, 2010

Storm Engine

Remembering the Citicorp Case: Ethics & Engineering

The CitiCorp case is becoming a classic in the field of ethics & engineering. The question of contingency and vital decision-making in the face of possible tragedy is the focus.

History of the CitiCorp case

The fifty-nine story building that was to be the new home of the CitiCorp center rose to the skies in 1977 in Manhattan. Two of the biggest names in the engineering business were responsible for its inception and design. Hugh Stubbins and William LeMessurier were the “rock stars” that gave a mere space in midtown Manhattan a crowning new tower.

According to Eugene Kremer, a researcher for Cross Currents:

“The initial acclaim had not subsided when, through a series of serendipitous events, William LeMessurier recognized in June 1978 that the Citicorp tower's steel frame was structurally inadequate. Information about the details of his discovery and the actions that averted an epic disaster was secreted for the better part of two decades by LeMessurier, other engineers, academics, attorneys, equipment manufacturers, construction contractors, government officials, public safety and emergency response agencies, and by the client, Citicorp.”

Kramer continues with:

“Once the public silence was broken in an extended May 29, 1995 article in The New Yorker, the case quickly became a staple element in engineering and architectural ethics teaching. In virtually every instance I have discovered, William LeMessurier's professional behavior and ethical conduct, as well as that of the other participants, has received high praise.”

Possible problems

For many who had been wondering whether the local government had been unmindful of building safety, the answer is no. However, even if building safety codes had been followed, many possible factors were beyond the control of the engineers and contractors.

For example, quartering winds had already been threatening the overall integrity of the structure as it was being raised to the sky.

Another possible problem that might have compromised the strength of the steel substructure was the use of bolted joints. Bolted joints were used in the steel members of each of the fifty-nine floors of the CitiCorp tower. Instead of welded joints, the manufacturing company had proposed the used of bolted joints instead. The CitiCorp engineers had acquiesced to the proposal.

Stresses

The basic problem was that the wind was producing far too much stress. According to Kremer:

“LeMessurier acknowledges that his analyses undertaken after the building was completed and occupied revealed that quartering winds produced far higher stresses in the diagonal members than had been understood. Emergency consultations in Canada with the director and staff of the wind tunnel laboratory, where tests had been run on a model of the tower while it was still in design during 1973, led to appreciation that the problem was significantly more critical than he had realized.”

Kremer continues with:

“Returning from Canada to Cambridge, he met with a trusted colleague, drove to his Maine summer home where for several days he carefully worked through a series of detailed structural calculations and concluded that failure of a bolted joint at the thirtieth floor was likely in a sixteen-year storm. Among the courses of action he briefly considered was driving along the Maine Turnpike at a hundred miles an hour and steering into a bridge abutment without telling anyone else about the problem he had discovered.”

About the Author

The author of this article is Benedict Yossarian. Benedict works closely with companies in the Industrial and Engineering sector including Emics Calibration Services and Rufus Heavy Duty Hydraulic Cylinders.

Storm Engine Red Sky